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Abstract 
 
Economic cooperation between Hong Kong and Mainland China, especially 
Guangdong province, has flourished since the establishment of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) in 1997. The landmark in this process was 
the conclusion of the free trade agreement (FTA) between the two areas in 2003. The 
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) between Hong Kong and the 
Mainland cover liberalization of trade in goods, liberalization of trade in services, 
mutual recognition of professional qualifications, and other trade facilitation measures. 
This paper argues that a collaborative governance regime based on network 
coordination is emerging under “One Country, Two Systems” (OCTS) and the 
collaborative approach will be used to explain the intensifying Hong Kong-Mainland 
economic cooperation. This paper has three parts. Part one provides an overview of 
the evolution of intergovernmental mechanisms between Hong Kong and the 
Mainland and introduces the analytical framework. Part two discusses how the 
framework can be applied to the intergovernmental mechanisms on CEPA and part 
three analyzes the key provisions of CEPA and its implications. 
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Toward Collaborative Governance in Economic Cooperation between Hong 
Kong and Mainland China 
 
I. Introduction 
In response to competition in the global economy, the economic and spatial 
transformation of south China since late 1978 is characterized by the relocation of 
Hong Kong‟s manufacturing to the Mainland, its own development into a service and 
financial center, as well as the phenomenal industrialization and urbanization in 
Guangdong province, especially in the Pearl River Delta (the PRD) where the factors 
of production are cheaper (Sit, 2006).
1
 Complementary relations between Hong Kong 
and its hinterland reached a plateau by the late 1990s and both Guangdong and Hong 
Kong governments tried to move beyond the market to explore more government-led 
cooperation (Cheung, 2012b).   
 Economic cooperation between Hong Kong and Mainland China, especially 
Guangdong, has flourished since the founding of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR) in 1997. The Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement (CEPA) was the first free trade agreement (FTA) established between 
Hong Kong and the Mainland. Since Hong Kong‟s economic links concentrate on the 
                                                 
1
 The economic core of Guangdong is the PRD which comprises nine cities, namely Dongguan, 
Foshan, Huizhou, Guangzhou, Jiangmen, Shenzhen, Zhaoqing, Zhongshan and Zhuhai. 
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neighboring Guangdong province, economic integration with this region has been 
further expedited by CEPA (Chan, 2010). The second milestone was the promulgation 
of a key regional plan, the Outline of the Plan for the Reform and Development of the 
PRD, 2008-2020 (the Outline Plan) in 2008, which supported economic integration 
and cooperation within the PRD and between Hong Kong and Guangdong. According 
to the Outline Plan, the PRD would work together with Hong Kong in the 
development of modern services, science and technology and higher education, 
among other areas. The Greater PRD region comprised of the PRD, Hong Kong and 
Macao aspired to become one of the mega metropolitan areas in the world (NDRC, 
2008). The role of Hong Kong in Guangdong would transform from one 
concentrating on export-oriented investment to one facilitating the development of a 
modern service economy. Just as Hong Kong uses CEPA to promote its trade and 
services on the Mainland and to secure its cooperation with Guangdong, the province 
seized this as an opportunity to expedite its own industrial restructuring because 
export-led processing manufacturing, a key driver of its development, could not 
sustain its economic future. The latest milestone was the dedicated chapter on Hong 
Kong and Macao in the 12
th
 National Five Year Plan (FYP) promulgated in March 
2011, which symbolized Hong Kong‟s deepening integration with China. 
 CEPA covers four areas. First, liberalization of trade in goods is achieved 
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through a tariff-free treatment of all goods of Hong Kong origin imported into the 
Mainland, upon applications by local manufacturers and the agreements of CEPA 
rules of origin. Second, liberalization of trade in services allows for preferential 
treatment of Hong Kong service suppliers (HKSS) entering into the Mainland market. 
Third, agreements for the mutual recognition of professional qualifications were 
expedited. And fourth, trade and investment were facilitated through bilateral 
measures to improve the overall business and regulatory environment. CEPA adopts a 
building-block approach. Subsequent to the conclusion of the Main Text and Six 
Annexes in 2003, nine Supplements were concluded between 2004 and 2012.  
This paper argues that a collaborative governance regime based on network 
coordination is emerging under “One Country, Two Systems” (OCTS) and the 
collaborative approach will be used to explain the intensifying Hong Kong-Mainland 
economic cooperation.
2
  This paper has three parts. Part one overviews the evolution 
of intergovernmental mechanisms between Hong Kong and the Mainland and 
introduces the analytical framework. Part two discusses how the framework can be 
applied to the intergovernmental mechanisms on CEPA and part three analyzes the 
key provisions of CEPA and its implications.  
                                                 
2
 Aside from documentary data, the author has used information provided in seminars and conferences 
on CEPA and many interviews and conversations with officials and experts in both areas. However, the 
full details of the intergovernmental meetings are kept confidential and cannot be obtained even 
through such interviews. This paper cannot offer a systematic assessment of the operation of the 
intergovernmental mechanisms involved because of the lack of sufficient publicly available 
information.  
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II. Toward Collaborative Governance in Economic Cooperation under “One 
Country, Two Systems”: Intergovernmental Mechanisms for Managing CEPA 
 
The Evolution of Intergovernmental Mechanisms under “One Country, Two 
Systems” 
The HKSAR functions like a highly autonomous city-state. The HKSAR government 
possesses substantial powers in economic, financial and social affairs, including 
international economic relations, except diplomacy and defence (Cheung, 2011).  A 
relatively clear delineation of power between the central authorities and the HKSAR 
is stipulated in the Basic Law, Hong Kong‟s mini-constitution, but it has not specified 
how the HKSAR should conduct intergovernmental relations with Chinese 
counterparts. While the central authorities have increasingly shaped Hong Kong‟s 
internal governance since 2003, Beijing has strongly supported economic cooperation 
with Hong Kong (Cheung, 2011). Consequently, this has allowed both the central and 
HKSAR governments room to innovate on intergovernmental mechanisms. As Hong 
Kong is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and China finally joined 
the organization in 2001, the conduct of CEPA negotiations and its provisions have to 
abide by this international regime to ensure proper compliance by all parties.  
 Efforts to enhance both vertical and horizontal coordination with different 
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Mainland governments have been attempted by the HKSAR government since 1997. 
Cooperation with the Mainland cuts across different policy arenas, hence this requires 
a consensus among Hong Kong‟s top policy-makers, notably the Chief Executive and 
his deputies, the Chief Secretary for Administration and the Financial Secretary, to 
drive the collaboration. Both Guangdong and Hong Kong emphasized bilateral 
cooperation as soon as the HKSAR was established. Indeed, the Hong Kong 
Guangdong Cooperation Joint Conference framework (the HKGDCJC) was created in 
1998, but the lack of enthusiasm under a former Chief Secretary (1997 to mid-2001) 
did not facilitate such an endeavor. 
 The HKGDCJC framework was reorganized and upgraded in August 2003 to 
strengthen horizontal coordination between Hong Kong and Guangdong. Originally 
headed by Guangdong‟s Executive Vice-governor and HKSAR‟s Chief Secretary, the 
Conference was upgraded to the level of Guangdong‟s Governor and Hong Kong‟s 
Chief Executive. An Executive Vice-governor and the Chief Secretary would steer 
and follow up. Other key improvements include: (a) aside from the annual plenary, 
annual working-level meetings were convened to monitor developments; (b) a Liaison 
Office was established on each side to coordinate day-to-day affairs; (c) research 
institutes were designated to offer research support; and (d) a business committee was 
created to foster economic links with the business sector on both sides (the Greater 
6 
 
PRD Business Council was established in 2004). Further, a total of fifteen expert 
groups were consolidated under the HKGDCJC to build coherence in 
intergovernmental cooperation. Before 2003, such groups covered conventional areas 
such as boundary management, environmental protection, infrastructural coordination 
and tourism. After mid-2003, the scope of cooperation was extended to new 
socio-economic spheres. By 2012, a total of 22 expert groups covering a wide range 
of areas, including infrastructure, innovation, economic development, planning, 
education, trade, social welfare, regional cooperation, environment, services, 
sustainability and implementation, have been established. 
 
Studies on Collaborative Governance and Coordination 
The study of governance has expanded rapidly in public administration and political 
science, but despite the abandonment of the assumption of a powerful, national state 
that can steer socio-economic transformation, there is a diversity of empirical focus 
and theoretical perspectives on the changing interactions and relationships between 
the state, civil society and the market under globalization (e.g. Bevir, 2011; Chhotray 
and Stoker, 2009; Pierre and Peters, 2000). One of the major interests in governance 
studies concerns the changes in the relations between different levels of government, 
both within and between nation-states, with the rise of subnational authorities such as 
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cities and regions and supranational units such as the European Union and 
international institutions such as the WTO (Pierre and Peters, 2000, pp. 114-136).  
 As globalization advances, global cities and global city regions emerge to meet 
the demand for command and control functions in the global economy. Amid the 
dispersal of authority from central governments to supranational, regional and local 
governments, and the proliferation of public-private networks, state and non-state 
actors at different territorial levels are becoming interdependent, forming 
general-purpose or special-purpose governing jurisdictions (Cheung, 2010, pp. 50-53). 
Three main perspectives, namely the global cities/global city regions, multi-level 
governance, and coordination, have been applied to the study of regional development 
in Greater China (Cheung, 2010). The applicability of the global cities/global city 
regions perspective is complicated by the challenges confronting Hong Kong as a 
command and control center of the global economy with the rise of Chinese cities and 
the rivalry between local jurisdictions within the Greater PRD. The multi-level 
governance perspective also underestimates the continued importance of the central 
government and lacks a theoretical explanation of the complex interactions between 
the actors (Cheung, 2010). Hence these two perspectives seem less promising than the 
coordination perspective in analyzing the intergovernmental coordination that 
underpins Hong Kong-Mainland economic cooperation. 
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 Inter-organizational or intergovernmental coordination is usually attained 
through one of three mechanisms: hierarchy, market and network (Bouckaert et al., 
2010). Hierarchy uses political or bureaucratic authority, which would be translated 
into rules and planning in top-down control. However, China largely abandoned 
central planning since 1978 in favor of a decentralized, market-oriented development 
model. As the central government cannot effectively coordinate the localities in a 
fragmented planning system, it is common for local governments to influence the 
central authorities through bargaining and lobbying (Xu, 2008). On the other hand, 
the market approach suggests that policy actors can coordinate through exchanges 
based on self-interest, using “regulated quasi-markets and economic incentives” to 
generate “incentives for actors to coordinate, and to enhance their collective 
performance” (Bouckaert et al., 2010, p. 42). This perspective does not seem 
applicable to the intergovernmental coordination in Hong Kong-Mainland economic 
cooperation. Although the different government players act on their particular 
interests, they are not actually engaged in market-type exchanges. The third 
mechanism is networks, which can be defined as “stable patterns of cooperative 
interaction between mutually dependent actors around specific issues of policy (or 
management)” (Bouckaert et al., 2010, p. 44). There are different types of 
network-type coordination ranging from information sharing and “mutual awareness 
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of interdependence and common interest” to agreements or contracts, joint 
decision-making mechanisms or joint organizations (Bouckaert et al., 2010, p. 45). 
Such coordination aptly illustrates the Hong Kong-Mainland case as the promotion of 
economic cooperation at the intergovernmental level depends upon give-and-take, 
rather than just maximization of self-interest, and the adjustment of mutual demands 
after reiterative interactions between different actors. Each of the players also has to 
engage its own clusters of stakeholders to achieve collaborative objectives. Although 
the concept of network coordination is useful in characterizing the intergovernmental 
interactions between Hong Kong and Mainland China, it does not offer a robust 
framework to explain the process, dynamics and outcomes of such interactions.   
 In the study of collaborative governance, some theoretical frameworks are more 
narrowly focused. For instance, Ansell and Gash concentrated on “formal, 
consensus-oriented and deliberative” public policy processes engaging both 
government and non-government stakeholders (2008, p. 544). Others examined 
collaborative network management (e.g. Agranoff and McGuire, 2004) or 
collaborative public management when governments in developed democracies could 
no longer effectively deliver public service and meet community demands in a 
top-down manner (e.g. Bingham and O‟Leary, 2008). Still others studied participatory 
governance or democratic governance (e.g. Bevir, 2010). The integrative framework 
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formulated by Kirk Emerson and his colleagues (2011), however, is not only more 
comprehensive and not restricted to inter-agency coordination and public management 
issues resulting from a decentered or hollowed state in developed democracies. It also 
details the structures, processes and dynamics of collaborative processes in generating 
policy outputs and outcomes. Hence this paper will apply this collaborative 
perspective to the growing Hong Kong-Mainland economic relationship. 
 
Toward a Collaborative Governance Regime (CGR) in Greater China 
Most studies on CEPA analyzed the structures of economic integration (e.g. Chen et 
al., 2006 and 2008; Chiu, 2006) or the economic impacts of CEPA (e.g. Chen and 
Zeng, 2006; Li, 2008). Others examined the role of CEPA in fostering regional 
integration (e.g. Chan, 2010) or the legal challenges involved (e.g. Zhang, 2010). 
Most of these studies are prescriptive and policy-oriented. None has examined the 
issue from a collaboration perspective. The collaborative perspective draws from 
inter-organizational studies. According to Emerson et al. (2011, p. 2), collaborative 
governance can be defined as “the processes and structures of public policy decision 
making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of 
public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in 
order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished.” This 
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approach highlights not only formal and informal interactions, but also 
non-governmental, governmental and intergovernmental collaboration (Emerson et al., 
2011, p. 14). What is unique about the governance arrangements under OCTS is that 
collaborative mechanisms were adopted in intergovernmental cooperation, at least in 
the economic arena, within a unitary socialist polity. 
Under OCTS, Hong Kong operates as a separate economic system within the 
Chinese polity. While the State Council, the highest executive authority, is the 
superior of the HKSAR, intergovernmental interactions do not follow a hierarchical 
pattern whereby the central government imposes its will over Hong Kong. Instead, 
intergovernmental interactions between Mainland China and the HKSAR occur 
through vertical and horizontal networks characterized by “bargaining, negotiation 
and mutual cooptation among the participants” (Bouckaert et al., 2010, p. 44). For 
instance, central ministries negotiated CEPA and its subsequent expansion with the 
HKSAR government in accordance with WTO rules. Hierarchical coordination can 
still be found in central-provincial relationships in China as it is within the socialist 
polity. However, interactions between the central authorities in Beijing and Hong 
Kong and between Hong Kong and Guangdong, are like voluntary collaboration 
between organizations or governments. Beijing does not dictate to Guangdong or 
Hong Kong unilaterally; rather, it often approves a strategic framework to promote 
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cooperation between Hong Kong and its neighbor.  
The collaborative governance regime (CGR) framework can be applied to the 
intergovernmental mechanisms created for CEPA and related areas (Emerson et al., 
2011, p. 35; see Table 1). First, the political, legal, socioeconomic, and environmental 
features frame the system context of the CGR. These factors shape the collaboration 
dynamics by providing incentives and disincentives for the actors. For example, with 
China‟s accession to the WTO, the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce 
recommended the FTA concept to the HKSAR government, which proposed it to 
Beijing in late 2001. The HKSAR government pursued vertical coordination by 
lobbying the central government for support to build cooperation with Guangdong. 
Initially, the central authorities were concerned that foreign firms in Hong Kong 
would exploit this FTA to enter the Mainland market earlier than the WTO schedule. 
However, the economic downturn exacerbated by the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome in early 2003 further weakened the Hong Kong economy in the aftermath 
of the Asian Financial Crisis. In response to the weak performance of the HKSAR 
administration under Tung Chee-hwa in coping with the economic deterioration and 
the political crisis triggered by the anti-national security legislation in mid-2003, 
which aroused grave concerns about the encroachment of civil liberties in Hong Kong, 
Beijing employed a more proactive strategy to support the HKSAR and its economic 
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integration with the Mainland (Cheung, 2011). The subsequent global financial 
tsunami that erupted in 2008 also prompted Beijing to continue supporting Hong 
Kong‟s economy with measures ranging from expansion of CEPA to backing Hong 
Kong‟s efforts to become an international financial center.  
 Second, the drivers of a CGR refer to leadership, consequential incentives, 
interdependence and uncertainty, which initiate and steer the direction of a CGR 
(Emerson et al., 2011, p. 9). Leadership is crucial in initiating and sustaining 
collaboration by securing resources and making a commitment to reinforce the 
collaboration. Consequential incentives concern internal or external crisis, threats and 
opportunities. Interdependence means that different parties realize they cannot 
accomplish a goal on their own except through collaboration. Uncertainty is also a 
main challenge in managing collective problems and is related to other drivers such as 
interdependence. These drivers are useful in explaining the key landmarks in Hong 
Kong-Mainland/Guangdong cooperation since 1997. Although Tung Chee-hwa, the 
first Chief Executive of the HKSAR, stressed cooperation with the Mainland, he 
lacked administrative support to steer such collaboration; he could only secure such 
support when a new Chief Secretary and a new Financial Secretary assumed office in 
mid-2001. From 1998 to 2001, economic cooperation had low policy agenda status 
and thus, the HKGDCJC was not very effective. More cross-boundary initiatives were 
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proposed only after mid-2001. Aside from the continual effort of Tung Chee-hwa and 
the change of senior administrative leadership in Hong Kong in mid-2001, the 
appointment of Donald Tsang as the Chief Executive in 2005 (after Tung‟s departure) 
and his re-appointment in 2007 consolidated the agenda toward closer cooperation 
with the Mainland. 
 Similarly, the leadership factor in Guangdong is equally important to make 
collaboration work. While the former Guangdong leader Zhang Dejiang championed 
Pan-PRD regional cooperation involving 9 provinces plus Hong Kong and Macao, the 
lack of central endorsement and his departure soon shelved this initiative. In response 
to the intense competition from other regions such as the Yangtze Delta, Guangdong 
province has been exploring its development strategy amid great uncertainty both 
regionally and globally. Guangdong‟s reorientation toward the development of 
modern services and the upgrading of its manufacturing has become more prominent 
after Wang Yang‟s appointment as Party Secretary in late 2007. Unlike his processor, 
Wang favored closer cooperation with Hong Kong in order to support Guangdong‟s 
economic transformation into a modern economy (Cheung, 2012a). This provides 
incentives for the province to open up its market to Hong Kong services and 
investments under CEPA. The provincial authorities also partnered with Hong Kong 
in seeking central government approval over the Outline Plan for the PRD in late 
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2008 (Cheung, 2012a). Last but not least, strong support from the central leadership 
under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao is critical because none of the CEPA initiatives could 
be approved without their backing. 
 Third, the collaborative dynamics consist of principled engagement, shared 
motivation and capacity for joint action. Together they produce collaborative actions 
to achieve the goals of the CPR (Emerson et al., 2011, pp. 10-12). Principled 
engagement takes place when different stakeholders interact in cross-organizational 
networks to resolve problems under principles such as fair, balanced representation 
and communication. Shared motivation comes from the fostering of trust and 
understanding which comes from repeated quality interactions between the actors. 
Such processes “will stimulate the development of institutional arrangements, 
leadership, knowledge, and resources” (Emerson et al., 2011, p. 16) which sustain the 
capacity for joint actions. 
 The approval of CEPA by the central government coincided with the 
reorganization of the HKGDCJC in 2003. The revamped HKGDCJC promotes a new 
institutional mechanism that facilitates (a) clear steering and monitoring from the 
highest level of government; (b) deepening of cooperation for information exchange 
and joint actions through expert groups; and (c) engagement of the non-government 
sector (e.g. collaboration with the Greater PRD Business Council). Regular working 
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meetings by the expert groups, mentioned previously, meet as needed. This network 
of expert groups shows that intergovernmental cooperation between Hong Kong and 
Guangdong is becoming much more institutionalized. These revamped mechanisms 
and other institutional arrangements under CEPA stimulate collaboration dynamics 
(see below). 
Finally, these interactions have produced collaborative outcomes, namely 
impacts and potential adaptation which may change the system context and the 
collaboration process in government. The nine Supplements to CEPA and the early 
implementation measures introduced can be considered collaborative outcomes, as 
they are mutually beneficial to both Hong Kong and Guangdong. These collaborative 
policy outputs that resulted from intergovernmental negotiation and coordination 
should be considered as the outcomes of this CGR as these were produced after 
intense negotiation and coordination among different governments and their 
respective professions and industries.  
 
 
[Table 1 about here]
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Collaborative Dynamics 
CEPA is an apt example of a CGR not only between the Hong Kong and Mainland 
Chinese governments, but also between these governments and the professional and 
business sectors.  
 
Joint Steering Committee (JSC) 
First, the highest level is a JSC chaired by a vice-minister of the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOC) and the Financial Secretary. Its functions include: (a) supervision 
of the implementation of CEPA; (b) interpretation of the provisions; (c) resolution of 
disputes that may arise from implementation; (d) amendment of the contents of CEPA; 
and (d) steering on its various working groups. In short, this Committee oversees the 
institutional infrastructure, coordinates the interactions between different units within 
its ambit, and approves of further supplements to CEPA.  
 
Senior Officials Meetings  
Below the JSC is a senior officials' meeting, established in 2007, that meets at least 
annually to discuss the expansion of CEPA, examine macro issues and review 
implementation. Ongoing dialogues between different departments in the HKSAR 
government and their Mainland counterparts have become very common (Interview, 
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2012a). As the Basic Law promises Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy, Beijing 
has not used hierarchy to achieve coordination and imposed its authority unilaterally 
over intergovernmental interactions between Hong Kong and the 
Mainland/Guangdong. Instead, such interactions are characterized by efforts to 
establish “common knowledge, common values and common strategies between 
partners” (Bouckaert et al., 2010, pp. 49-50). These intergovernmental interactions are 
held at an appropriate administrative level of the central government and the HKSAR. 
For instance, a vice-minister of the MOC and the Financial Secretary would lead the 
JSC while the senior officials meeting would be led by a deputy division head of the 
MOC and the Director of the Trade and Industry Department (TID) of the HKSAR. 
There are ongoing dialogues among the lead agencies, i.e. the Commerce and 
Economic Development Bureau (CEDB) and its subordinate TID, the MOC and 
related bureaus. The TID mainly serves as a coordinator of different bureaus and 
departments inside the HKSAR government.  
 
Expert Group on CEPA Services Implementation 
Since most of Hong Kong's investments in China are located in Guangdong, an expert 
group was formed under the HKGDCJC to discuss implementation procedures for 
CEPA. While many expert groups touch upon different areas related to CEPA, this 
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expert group is the key mechanism dealing with the services, the core challenge for 
Hong Kong‟s firms to benefit under CEPA (CITB, 2004). Led by a permanent 
secretary of the CEDB and its counterpart from Guangdong‟s Economic and 
Information Commission, the group exchanges information on service cooperation 
and explores measures to improve implementation and cooperation. The group has 
also jointly conducted seminars to disseminate information and consult the industry in 
Hong Kong and their Chinese counterparts (Interview, 2012b). 
 
Network Mechanism of the Central Government in Hong Kong  
Central government has been very supportive of Hong Kong and its integration with the 
PRD, in order to accelerate the economic transformation of Hong Kong and the 
upgrading of services and industries in Guangdong (Cheung, 2012a). The 
representative of the central authority in Hong Kong is the Liaison Office (LO) of the 
Central Government. Inside the LO is a Trade Office of the Economic Affairs 
Department, which is jointly led by the MOC and the LO. Its main functions include: 
strengthening the liaison between the HKSAR government and the relevant authorities 
in the Mainland, participating in the JSC on CEPA, implementing and negotiating 
arrangements under CEPA, promoting cooperation between the two sides, building a 
platform for consultation on financial and trade-related matters, and providing support 
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to cooperation between enterprises from both sides (DFTEC, 2007 & 2011). The 
importance attached by the central government to these major functions in network 
coordination with both business and government in Hong Kong is reflected in the 
appointment of a highly experienced official (aged 51) at the deputy-ministerial level of 
the MOC to assume the deputy directorship of the LO over economic affairs (Hong 
Kong Economic Times, 2003). 
In sum, the formulation and implementation of CEPA measures show that Hong 
Kong and Mainland China (and especially Guangdong) have been able to build upon 
the mutual trust and understanding developed since 2003. Based on the authors‟ 
interviews with officials familiar with trade issues, such interactions are frequent and 
based on good understanding of each other since 1998. The proliferation of 
intergovernmental units between Hong Kong and Guangdong shows that bilateral 
collaboration has reached a higher level of network coordination. The expert groups 
demonstrate that deliberation has reached a higher level of specialization, and can 
effectively address issues in a variety of areas. Since 2003, many business 
associations and professional bodies requested the expansion and implementation of 
CEPA arrangements. Supplement VIII addressed many of the requests from Hong 
Kong‟s businesses, although not always to the full extent requested. Guangdong 
province was interested in expanding investment in services from Hong Kong because 
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it aimed to upgrade its services. While the localities inside Guangdong did not fully 
welcome the influx of such Hong Kong services initially because of protectionist 
sentiments, the impact of Hong Kong services on Guangdong was not as strong as 
expected. Moreover, it was recognized that such Hong Kong services would bring 
investment and employment. Guangdong ultimately welcomed early implementation 
because it gave them more power to approve such service investments and was 
beneficial for opening up to foreign investment in this area. In short, the formulation 
and implementation of CEPA measures show that Hong Kong and Mainland China 
(and especially Guangdong) were able to build upon the mutual trust and 
understanding developed through intergovernmental mechanisms since 2003. 
 
III. An Analysis of Key Provisions of CEPA and its Implications for 
Collaborative Governance 
CEPA covers three main areas. First, it functions as an intergovernmental mechanism 
effectively producing collaborative outcomes in liberalizing the trade in goods. For 
example, the Mainland applied zero-tariff to the import of 273 goods of Hong Kong 
origin stated in the initial CEPA agreement, and another 713 goods in Supplement I 
signed in 2004 (TID, 2003a, 2004). The rules of origin have also become more 
flexible since 2009. For instance, in Supplement II, both sides agreed to discuss the 
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rules of origin more frequently, from once a year to twice a year (GIC, 2005) and 
since 2006, the Mainland offered zero-tariff to all imports of Hong Kong origin after 
signing Supplement II (TID, 2005).  
    In the trade in services, a total of 21 service sectors were liberalized under CEPA 
in 2003 (TID, 2003b). With the adoption of the nine Supplements, the number 
increased to 47 services. All in all, these changes involved a total of 338 liberalization 
measures (GIC, 2012b). These can be divided into different categories, including (1) 
relaxation on the minimum assets and registered capital required for establishing an 
enterprise in the Mainland; (2) permission to provide services in the Mainland in the 
form of wholly-owned operations (by 2011, HKSS in 35 service sectors were allowed 
to establish such wholly-owned operations); (3) waiving the residency requirement for 
the Hong Kong staffs/representatives in the Mainland; (4) relaxation on the proportion 
of foreign shareholding in some services; and (5) reducing the restrictions for some 
sectors on the location of operations, scope of services and potential customers (Chan, 
2010).  
 Another focus of the liberalization in services came with the adoption of the 
“early and pilot implementation” strategy since Supplement V, which allows various 
liberalization measures to be first implemented in selected provinces or cities before 
full implementation nationwide. Owing to its close economic ties with Hong Kong, 
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Guangdong province was selected for most of these measures. The central 
government delegated powers to Guangdong provincial government upon approval of 
the applications from HKSS to establish operations in Guangdong in areas such as 
outpatient clinics, environmental pollution control facilities, travel agencies, 
enterprises providing road freight transport services, repair and driver training, 
passenger and freight transport stations, and medical institutions. Guangdong 
government was also granted authority in issuing accounting qualification certificates 
and approving applications from Hong Kong enterprises to organize foreign economic 
and technical exhibitions. Since 2008, 64 measures were announced for „early and 
pilot implementation‟ under CEPA. In Supplement VIII, some pilot measures in 
Guangdong were extended. For instance, the mutual recognition of qualifications for 
architects and structural engineers was extended from Guangdong to the whole 
country. The permission to establish wholly-owned hospitals was also extended from 
five provinces and municipalities in Supplement VII to all centrally administered 
municipalities and provincial capitals (TID, 2011). Moreover, the definition of 
“HKSS” was relaxed over time to facilitate trade in services. (TID, 2011). The latest 
Supplement IX signed in mid-2012 further relaxed market entry conditions for 21 
sectors, and offered favorable treatment of education services. Some of the early 
implementation measures would also be piloted in Qianhai and Hengqin, two new 
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sites designated for Guangdong‟s reform a in services in cooperation with Hong Kong 
(TID, 2012c).  
 Trade and investment facilitation measures helped to improve or create new 
institutional and procedural arrangements to expedite cooperation, enhance 
transparency of rules, adopt standard conformity and improve information exchange 
between Hong Kong and the Mainland (Chan, 2010). The Main Text includes 
cooperation measures in seven areas, namely “trade and investment promotion”, 
“customs clearance facilitation”, “commodity inspection and quarantine, food safety 
and quality and standardization”, “electronic business”, “transparency in laws and 
regulations”, “cooperation of small and medium enterprises”, “cooperation in Chinese 
traditional medicine and medical products” (TID, 2010). By Supplement IX, such 
facilitate measures have increased to ten, extending to such areas as “protection of 
intellectual property”, “cooperation on branding” and “cooperation on education” 
(TID, 2011, 2012c).  
 
From Building Capacity for Joint Actions to Collaborative Actions 
These facilitation measures provide ample examples of (a) building capacity for joint 
action and (b) collaborative policy outputs or collaborative actions from Emerson‟s 
perspective. These involve the coordination and cooperation between specific 
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agencies of governments between Hong Kong and the central/Guangdong authorities 
and the engagement between these governments and their professional and business 
operators on both sides. They cover three broad categories: (a) procedural and 
institutional arrangements, which develop new (or strengthen existing) administrative 
measures for joint action to achieve better coordination and cooperation, (b) sharing 
information and knowledge or resources and exchange/training, and (c) joint efforts 
which entail specific joint measures that would be undertaken together (sometime in 
partnership with industry and professions). These can be considered as collaborative 
actions or CGR outputs. For some areas, the JSC coordinates and steers the 
development of newly established working groups (e.g. e-business and branding), 
while for others, relevant government agencies will employ measures to promote 
industries (e.g. Chinese medicine and environmental industry) or improve 
intergovernmental mechanisms in policy implementation (e.g. customs clearance and 
inspection of commodities and food safety).  
   CEPA also includes a series of mutually beneficial measures to strengthen the 
financial cooperation between Hong Kong and the Mainland. For instance, more 
favorable arrangements were adopted for Hong Kong banks to establish branches in 
the Mainland (TID, 2007). The focus was not only on improving market entrance for 
Hong Kong enterprises, but more importantly, the “full utilization of financial 
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intermediaries in Hong Kong during the process of reform, restructuring and 
development of the financial sector in the Mainland” (TID, 2003b). For instance, the 
Mainland supported Chinese banks to relocate their international treasury and foreign 
exchange trading centers to Hong Kong (TID, 2003b). Qualified Mainland securities 
and futures companies were also allowed to set up subsidiaries in Hong Kong (TID, 
2007, 2009, 2010). Supplement VIII states that the banking industry in the Mainland 
should “make use of the Hong Kong‟s international financial platform” for its 
development (TID, 2011). Financial cooperation was further strengthened in 
Supplement IX, including efforts by Mainland authorities to support qualified Chinese 
firms to get listed in Hong Kong and cooperation in the development of commodity 
futures market and facilitating Hong Kong‟s financial sector to participate in China‟s 
capital markets (TID, 2012c; GIC 2012b). Such provisions show that the CGR has 
produced mutually beneficial arrangements conducive to the financial development of 
both sides. 
    Another major provision of CEPA is the mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications between Hong Kong and the Mainland. Since 2003, Hong Kong and the 
Mainland agreed on mutually recognition of six kinds of professional qualifications, 
namely construction and related engineering services, securities and futures services, 
insurance services, patent agents services, professional accountancy services, and 
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estate agents (TID, 2012a). CEPA also addresses the registration and practice issues 
after Hong Kong residents have obtained professional qualifications. Further, CEPA 
includes some favorable measures for Hong Kong residents to obtain Chinese 
professional qualifications more easily (TID, 2009). 
 
Implications of CEPA 
CEPA has contributed to Hong Kong‟s prosperity and its deepening integration with 
the Mainland, especially the PRD (Chan, 2010; Chen et al., 2008). This section 
analyzes the benefits and limitations of CEPA, focusing more on the Hong Kong case 
because unlike Hong Kong, Guangdong has not yet conducted careful assessments of 
its impacts.  
 
Benefits from CEPA 
The liberalization of trade in goods under CEPA helps Hong Kong manufacturers save 
cost on tariffs by applying the Certificate of Hong Kong origin-CEPA, or CO(CEPA). 
From 2004 to April 2012, the total export value of goods from Hong Kong under 
CEPA jumped from HK$0.99 billion to HK$40 billion (CITB, 2005, p.1; GIC, 2012a). 
The total tariff savings under CPEA largely increased from 66 million yuan to 2.83 
billion yuan (CITB, 2005, p.2; GIC, 2012a). Besides, from 2004 to May 2012, the 
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number of the approved applications for CO(CEPA) greatly increased from 3,211 to 
85,015. The number of the approved applications also rose from 3,008 to in 2004 to 
83,093 in May 2012. (CITB, 2005, p.2; TID, 2012b). Besides, the sectoral distribution 
of the applications for CO(CEPA) shows changes during the past 8 years. In 2005, the 
approved applications for CO(CEPA) mainly concentrated on the products of “textiles 
and clothing”, “pharmaceutical products”, “chemical products and coloring” and 
“plastics and plastic articles”. However, some niche products, such as food and 
beverages, were not allowed to apply for CO(CEPA). This problem was completely 
solved after Supplement II. By May 2012, the application for CO(CEPA) for the 
products of “food and beverages”, “textiles and clothing”, “plastics and plastic articles” 
and “pharmaceutical products” accounted for around 80 percent of such applications.  
    The liberalization of trade in services under CEPA facilitates the entrance of 
HKSS to the Mainland market. Since 2003, 1,663 applications for Certificate of 
HKSS have been received and 1,615 approved. The approved applications 
concentrated on “transport and logistics services”, “distribution services”, “air 
transport services” and “advertising services”, accounting for around 70 percent of the 
total applications. Although the number of applications for HKSS Certificates 
recorded declines in recent years, CEPA is still inducing an increasing the amount of 
capital investment in Hong Kong through the liberalization of trade in goods and 
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services. The recent assessment on the impacts of CEPA by the HKSAR government 
shows that the liberalization of trade of goods under CEPA induced an additional 
HK$103 million and HK$202 million capital investment to Hong Kong in 2005 and 
2006 respectively (CITB, 2007, p. 2). The liberalization of trade in services under 
CEPA induced HK$2 billion and HK$1.7 billion capital investment to Hong Kong in 
2005 and 2006 respectively (CITB, 2007, p. 2). Supplement III signed in June 2006 
further liberalized trade in services by relaxing market access conditions for legal 
services, construction, information technology, convention and exhibition, audiovisual 
services, distribution, tourism, transport and individually-owned stores, which greatly 
favors their development. The business receipts obtained by Hong Kong companies 
engaging in trade in services from Mainland-related business due to CEPA recorded a 
drastic increase from HK$4.2 billion in 2006 to HK$18.3 billion in 2007 (EABF Unit, 
2010b, p. 8). By 2009, the liberalization of trade in services had already brought a 
cumulative total of business receipts of HK$61.6 billion to these Hong Kong 
companies (EABF Unit, 2010b, p. 8).  
   Another benefit brought by CEPA is the facilitation on the flow of people between 
Hong Kong and the Mainland China, most notably tourists joining the Individual Visit 
Scheme (IVS). In 2011, Mainland residents made 18.3 million trips to Hong Kong 
under the IVS, accounting for 65.3 percent of all the Mainland visitors. In fact, 
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Mainland China has become the largest source of visitors to Hong Kong and 
accounted for 67 percent of the total arrivals in 2011 (Tourism Commission, 2012). In 
2009, the IVS visitors have generated HK$26.4 billion in tourist spending in Hong 
Kong, which was almost three times the amount in 2004 (EABF Unit, 2010a, p.3). 
The value-added brought by IVS to Hong Kong‟s economy was estimated to be 
HK$16.1 billion in 2009, about 2.5 times the amount in 2004 (EABF Unit, 2010a, 
p.5).  
 CEPA also increases employment in Hong Kong. By 2006, 34,938 job 
opportunities were created in Hong Kong, accounting for 12 percent of the total new 
jobs created in Hong Kong in that period (CITB, 2007, p. 1). Of the new jobs created 
by CEPA, 73.7 percent of them were related to the IVS, while 26.3 percent of them 
were created by the liberalization of trade in goods and services (CITB, 2007, p. 2). 
The estimated number of jobs created by the IVS increased from 19,158 in 2004 to 
50,281 in 2009 (EABF Unit, 2010b, p.5). CEPA has fostered the mobility of 
production factors between Hong Kong and the Mainland, which was mainly 
achieved by the mutual recognition of the professional qualifications and the 
increased flow of capital (Chan, 2010, p.169).  
 
CEPA’s impacts on the Mainland and Guangdong 
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Not only has CEPA supported Hong Kong‟s economy, but it has also produced 
benefits to the Mainland. The assessment by HKSAR government in 2006 shows that 
CEPA had induced HK$9.2 billion investment in the service sector in the Mainland 
between 2004 and 2006 (CITB, 2007, p.5). CEPA created around 17,000 job 
opportunities in the Mainland in the same period and 16,000 of them were filled by 
the Mainland residents (CITB, 2007, p.5). Owing to its close economic ties with Hong 
Kong, Guangdong benefited most from the economic cooperation with Hong Kong.  
    One of the major benefits brought by CEPA on Guangdong is the introduction of 
foreign investment from Hong Kong. The actual utilized foreign investment from 
Hong Kong to Guangdong increased by 44 percent from US$11 billion in 2003 to 
US$13 billion in 2010 (SBG, 2004, p. 455, 2011, p. 498). Although the investment 
from Hong Kong still concentrates on manufacturing, the increasing investment in 
services is largely facilitated by CEPA. In 2011, Hong Kong‟s investment in service 
accounts for 44 percent of the total actual foreign investment in Guangdong, which is 
17 percent higher than its figure in 2003 (People‟s Daily Online, 2012). Since 2004, 
the actual foreign investment from Hong Kong in Guangdong‟s services amounted to 
US$30 billion, mainly focusing on “wholesale and retail”, “leasing and business 
services” and “transport, storage and postal services.” The trade between Guangdong 
and Hong Kong is also boosted by CPEA. The total value of trade between 
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Guangdong and Hong Kong increased by 170 percent from US$60 billion in 2003 to 
US$159 billion in 2010 (SBG, 2004, p. 455, 2011, p. 473). Other benefits of CEPA 
are also noteworthy. Guangdong‟s experts argue that CEPA has contributed positively 
to the liberalization of trade in the Greater PRD and generated the impetus for 
improving the regulatory and business environment inside the province and adopting 
international business practices, although currently many institutional obstacles 
blocking the entry of Hong Kong services to the PRD have not been fully removed 
yet (Chen et al., 2008). 
 
Limitations of CEPA 
It is apparent that CEPA has brought substantial benefits to Hong Kong‟s economy, 
but Hong Kong enterprises believed the benefits brought by the liberalization of trade 
were more significant than the benefits from the liberalization of services. According 
to a survey conducted by the HKSAR government (CITB, 2007), 77 percent of the 
Hong Kong‟s enterprises engaging in trade in goods believed that CEPA was 
conducive to their industries. On the other hand, only 47 percent of the Hong Kong‟s 
enterprises which engaged in trade in services held the same view. In fact, the general 
trend of applications for HKSS Certificates has been declining since 2005. As 
mentioned above, the approved applications for such Certificates mainly concentrated 
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in the traditional services, such as “transport and logistics services”, “distribution 
services”, “air transport services”. This reflects that the major function of CEPA at the 
moment is mainly to serve export processing between Hong Kong and the Mainland, 
while other services, such as professional services, still cannot easily enter or prosper 
in the Mainland. 
    In the survey conducted by the HKSAR government in 2006, 60 percent of the 
holders of HKSS Certificates reported that they encountered difficulties when setting 
up business in the Mainland under CEPA. The difficulties included “long processing 
time”, “complicated application procedures”, “insufficient transparency in policies 
and regulations”, and “high entry requirement” (CITB, 2007, p.14). Hong Kong 
service providers reported that they faced problems such as “not familiar with the 
business environment in the Mainland”, “complicated or heavy taxation system in the 
Mainland”, “insufficient transparency in policies and regulations” and “variation in 
the implementation of policies among local regions” (CITB, 2007, p.15). In fact, over 
95 percent of HKSS entering Guangdong did not go through the CEPA channel (The 
Greater PRD Business Council, 2012, p.3). 
    The poor utilization of the CO(CEPA) and HKSS Certificates reflects that the 
industrial and business sector did not fully recognize the benefits brought by CEPA. 
Approved CO(CEPA) applications rose substantially from 3,008 in 2004 to 19,033 in 
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2006 and 83,093 by May 2012 (CITB, 2005, p. 6 and 2007, p. 25; TID, 2012b). 
However, the utilization rate of CO(CEPA) rose only slightly from 4.7 percent in 
2004 to 8.1 percent in 2005 and 11.5 percent in 2006 (CITB, 2007, p. 43). Although 
the cumulative number of such HKSS Certificate issued rose by over 120 percent 
from 668 in 2004 to 2173 in September 2009, only 48 percent of the certificate 
holders established business operations in the Mainland during this period and they 
concentrated in three service sectors, namely management consulting (69.7 percent), 
freight forwarding agency (65.5 percent) and placement and supply services of 
personnel (62.0 percent) (EABF Unit, 2010b, p.3). 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has adopted the collaborative framework to examine CEPA and other 
related issues in economic cooperation by focusing on intergovernmental interactions 
among the central government, the Guangdong and HKSAR governments as well as 
their respective business sectors. Under OCTS, vertical coordination between the 
central government and the HKSAR governments and horizontal coordination 
between the Hong Kong and the Guangdong government have become increasingly 
frequent and productive. Although initially less active, the collaboration between 
Hong Kong and Guangdong has become much more effective after revamping the 
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HKGDCJC in 2003. There may be competing assessment of the outcomes of CEPA, 
but the collaboration achieved by these intergovernmental mechanisms has moved the 
different parties forward in further expanding CEPA provisions. This is the most 
important indicator of the achievement of collaborative outcomes. In sum, the 
growing intergovernmental interactions have contributed to better economic 
cooperation under the CEPA framework, although there are still issues and challenges 
(such as difficulties in implementation) that confront these different jurisdictions.  
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Table 1. A Diagnostic or Logic Model Approach to Collaborative Governance  
Dimension and 
Components System Context Drivers 
The Collaborative Governance Regime Collaborative 
Outcomes 
Adaption 
Collaborative Dynamics Outputs 
Collaborative 
Actions 
Principled 
Engagement Shared Motivation 
Capacity for Joint 
Action Impacts 
Elements within 
Component 
- Resource 
Conditions 
- Policy Legal 
Frameworks 
- Prior Failure to 
Address Issues 
- Political 
Dynamics/ 
Power Relations 
- Network 
Connectedness 
- Levels of 
Conflicts/Trust 
- Socio-economic/ 
Cultural Health 
& Diversity 
- Leadership 
- Consequential 
Incentives  
- Interdependence 
- Uncertainty  
- Discovery 
- Definition 
- Deliberation 
- Determination 
- Mutual Trust 
- Mutual 
Understanding 
- Internal 
Legitimacy 
- Shared 
Commitment 
- Procedural/Instit
utional 
Arrangements 
- Leadership 
- Knowledge 
- Resources 
Will depend on 
context and charge, 
but might include: 
- Securing 
Endorsements 
- Enacting Policy, 
Law, or Rule 
- Marshalling 
Resources 
- Deploying Staff 
- Siting/Permitting 
- Building/Cleanin
g Up 
- Enacting New 
Management 
Practice 
- Monitoring 
Implementation 
- Enforcing 
Compliance 
Will depend on 
context and charge, 
but aim is to alter 
pre-existing or 
projected conditions 
in System Context 
- Change in 
System Context 
- Change in the 
collaborative 
governance 
regime 
- Change in 
Collaboration 
Dynamics 
Source: Emerson et al. (2011, p.7)
